	N596ALLC CONFERENCE	
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	PETER ALLEN, on behalf of	
4	themselves and others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs,	
5	v. 19 CV 08173(LAP)	
6	CARL KOENIGSMANN, MD, et al.,	
7	Defendants.	
8	New York, N.Y.	
9	May 9, 2023 12:10 p.m.	
10	Before:	
11	HON. LORETTA A. PRESKA,	
12	District Judge	
13	APPEARANCES	
14	LAW OFFICE OF AMY JANE AGNEW	
15 16	Attorneys for Class Plaintiffs BY: AMY JANE AGNEW JOSHUA LEE MORRISON	
17	WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA	
18	Attorney for Defendant Moores BY: ORIANA KILEY	
19	CONWAY, DONOVAN & MANLEY PLLC	
20	Attorney for Defendants Andola, Gusman, Lee, Mantaro, Karandy, Acrish, Ashong, Braselmann BY: RYAN E. MANLEY	
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22	NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Attorneys for Defendants Koenigsmann, Mueller, Dinello,	
23	Hammer, Salotti BY: MICHAEL J. KEANE DANIEL SHULZE	
24	IAN RAMAGE	
25		

N596ALLC CONFERENCE 1 THE COURT: For plaintiff, please. 2 MS. AGNEW: Good afternoon, your Honor. Amy Jane Agnew for plaintiff class, Law Office of 3 4 Amy Jane Agnew. 5 MR. MORRISON: And Josh Morrison. 6 THE COURT: Good morning. 7 For defense. MS. KILEY: Good morning, your Honor. 8 9 Oriana Kiley on behalf of Dr. Moores in an official 10 capacity. 11 MR. MANLEY: Good morning, your Honor. 12 Ryan Manley from Conway Donovan & Manley on behalf of 13 the non-state representative defendants. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Manley. 15 MR. KEANE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Michael Keane from the Office of the 16 17 Attorney General --THE COURT: Yes, sir. Good afternoon. 18 MR. KEANE: -- for the CMOs. 19 20 MR. SCHULZE: Daniel Schulze, also for the 21 state-represented defendants. 22 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Shulze. 23

How would you like to proceed, counsel? How are going

MR. RAMAGE: And Ian Ramage --

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

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to get the language of the preliminary injunction, please?

And, Ms. Kiley, let me just say this: In my view, the order which you folks sent in with your May 4 letter is really bordering on bad faith, that in your view, the only order would be that the state medical providers provide pain treatment to the mentioned individuals is really quite ridiculous. So it was not a very helpful proposed order. So I ask again, how are we going to get the language of a preliminary injunction?

And I will point you folks to the language in the second amended complaint that is quoted at the top of Page 4 of the Court's opinion and order at Docket Number 552. And that recounts the equitable relief that plaintiffs were seeking and are seeking in the second amended complaint.

So how are we going to get this written down, counsel?

MS. KILEY: Your Honor. Sorry. May I be heard?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. KILEY: The order that follows the details of the findings of the Court for each of the seven witnesses who testified was written because we took all the findings and analyzed the conclusions made by the Court with respect to the analysis' unlikelihood of success on the merits, which the Court found that there was failure across several DOCCS facilities that medical providers are not prescribing pain medication reasonably. So that was what formed the basis of the language that we have in there.

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We understand that throughout this litigation, that my adversary has been advocating for what is referred to as individualized assessments and monitoring.

During a meet-and-confer, I asked my adversary if we can carve out some time to discuss what those terms actually mean, to which the response was no. I turned to my client, Dr. Moores, to ask what is an individualized assessment with respect to chronic pain, and Dr. Moores explained that it's actually not something that's utilized or recognized in medicine.

She explained that outside of this litigation, the only time she's ever really heard the term individualized assessment is in the context of patients with disabilities, to assess whether or not they need reasonable accommodations. even my client is confused, because as far as she knows, every time a patient is seeing a provider, they are being assessed, they are being evaluated.

THE COURT: Counsel, you're ignoring the findings that were made in the March 31 opinion and order. And the findings specifically say that DOCCS medical providers continue to deny and discontinue their patients' MWAP medications without medical justification. There were examples given in the opinion of discontinuation for none medical reasons. are looking for and what should be abundantly clear from reading the request for equitable relief is that pain

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medications be prescribed or discontinued only for medical reasons.

Is there any reason that you can't figure out how to write that down? And I'll also point you to Dr. Moores' declaration, which is summarized at Page 57 of the opinion and order, where she goes on to talk about some of the actions she has taken to assure the proper implementation of policy 1.2 4(A). That should be a starting point. Why is it that you can't write this down?

MS. KILEY: Your Honor, our apologies. We certainly didn't mean any bad faith. We're hoping to engage in productive discussions with our adversary. But, unfortunately, it didn't happen that way. We do think there are some terms that need to be further refined.

THE COURT: Why don't you write them down, counsel? As I recall it, I instructed your side of the table to write down a proposed order. When are we going to do that? Your time to appeal is not going to start until we get an order. Ιf you want to appeal, which I know you do because you've already filed a notice, you better get the order together. And the 90 days does not start running until we get an order. So how are we going to do that?

MS. KILEY: We can certainly continue a draft and communicate with our adversary prior to filing another draft with the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that the relief granted is to extend to all chronic pain patients, not just the named individuals who you included in Exhibit A to your May 4 letter? Do you understand that, counsel?

MS. KILEY: Respectfully, your Honor, to have the preliminary injunction apply to the class we think is at odds with both the PLRA and with 23(b)(2). The PLRA, as we know, requires that the injunction be narrowly tailored with the least intrusive means. If my adversary is looking for individualized assessments of 600-plus patients in 90 days, that's not -- we don't believe that's realistic or reasonable.

THE COURT: I also don't think that's what's being requested.

Could someone from plaintiff's table enlighten us on that topic?

MS. AGNEW: Your Honor, I've had some concerns since this opinion was issued that what defendants really wanted us to do was draft the injunction so that they would have further grounds for appeal. I get it. But what we need, and they actually ask the Court for, was to put forward a plan pursuant to the Second Court's holding in Dean v. Coughlin. We gave them this opportunity, and we agree with the Court, this is incredibly bad faith for a whole host of reasons.

I want to circle back to this notion of individualized assessments. There are actually two moments during our hearing

when Dr. Moores endorsed her definition of individualized assessments that she had sent via e-mail to her own providers. We simply ask that she adopt what she has recognized in her own writing to be an individualized assessment so that it can be done.

And I think the main salient points in that hearing were, one, that DOCCS hadn't identified the people who were injured; two, that they hadn't trained providers to stop the Constitutional violations; and three, that they had come forward with no plan for implementing individualized assessments. We certainly don't anticipate that they can get that done in 90 days, but we need a plan. And we gave them the ascertainability tools to start to identify those people. And I think when we get back this thing about the seven putative class members when I've got a class certified, it's bad faith.

We know who these people are. We at least know who 660 of them are. What's the plan? And we don't have a plan.

And, in fact, what I will say, I was told by Defendant Moores' counsel she'd be happy to sign a consent order, but she doesn't want to pay my fees and costs. And I get that. And I'll draft the consent order, but we are going to get our fees and draft orders anyway. The goal right now is to get injunctions and to get people treated.

And as I pointed out to the Court, we had to intervene just this last week to get medication for Mark Daniels, who sat

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on the stand and said he had no medication. He got it, they transferred him, he got caught off. This has to end, and it has to move fast.

She asked me for three weeks for this, and this is what we got. I think they get one more than week, we get a real plan, we get a real plan for identifying people, and for getting them assessed.

MS. KILEY: Your Honor, two things I want to address. As far as identifying victims of MWAP, the definition that was recognized -- excuse me. The definition of the injunctive class that was put forward by plaintiffs that was recognized by the Court are individuals who are or will be incarcerated, and individuals who are or will suffer from chronic neuropathies. Identifying victims of MWAP from the past doesn't fit this definition. And I don't believe there's been any case law or authority to put this onus on the defendants to identify who might be in plaintiff's class.

Further, we also know that at the beginning of this litigation, all of the MWAP request forms were already turned over to plaintiffs. So they have the information available to them as far as which patients were denied MWAP medications during the time period alleged in the second amended complaint. So as to --

> THE COURT: And so what?

MS. KILEY: And so we don't believe that incorporating

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a term that Dr. Moores should go back and identify the victims of MWAP fits into a preliminary injunction. It would be the plaintiffs who should identify who's in their class.

MS. AGNEW: Your Honor, please. First of all, I can't use the names in the database because of our HIPAA qualified protective order. They know that. They asked me to sign it. I actually drafted it for them. This is actually Dr. Moores' Constitutional violation to correct. It's not my Constitutional violation to correct. They know who they are. They gave me the forms. Start going down the list.

MS. KILEY: If I may. The Court in Walmart expressly went into great detail about what (b)(2) actually means. (b)(2) class is regarded as having no individual right to a particular relief independent of any other class member. So to ask for an injunction to apply to 600-plus patients, who, which already goes beyond the scope of what the PLRA allows, and to have them looked into individually, they don't fit into the PLRA or the (b)(2) class for purposes of a preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: I'm actually not understanding what you're saying, counsel.

MS. KILEY: For the scope of the injunction to be 600-plus goes outside of what the PLRA requires. requires that it be narrow and least intrusive mean "and no more than necessary."

The (b)(2) class also --

THE COURT: I'm not sure that the 600 people is not exactly that. How are you going to identify the individuals who need to be looked at to be sure they are getting the pain medication they need? What's your idea?

MS. KILEY: Our idea is that the plaintiffs tell us who is in their class.

THE COURT: It's not their job. It is the job of the defendants to identify who might be a chronic pain victim to assess whether those individuals are getting the proper treatment or not. And then there's the training aspect of it.

I thought all of this was pretty clear in the opinion. And, indeed, Dr. Moores, in her testimony, admitted that there had been no effort to identify the individuals. She, herself, as I recall it, undertook some auditing, but that was by no means a comprehensive review of who might be requiring chronic pain treatment.

MS. KILEY: Your Honor, our reading of the case law is a certified (b)(2) class is one that challenges a system or policy of practice, and it's not to evaluate individually the needs of each class member.

THE COURT: The system or practice that is being challenged here and which was found to exist was the practice of medical providers discontinuing or failing to prescribe pain medications for chronic pain victims who needed them. That's

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what the practice was. The question is, how are we going to write the order that requires not only that practice to cease but requires the review of all of the chronic pain patients to be sure they are getting the medication that they need.

Again, I'll point you back to Dr. Moores' declaration.

MS. AGNEW: We can certainly go back and talk to Dr. Moores to draft additional terms.

THE COURT: Why don't you folks go in the jury room and see what you can come up with? I will give you pads of paper. I see you have pads of paper. Why don't you go in there and sit down and take a look and start writing? I think that's going to be a lot more useful than waiting two weeks and getting two more pieces of paper.

Is there any reason we shouldn't do that?

MS. KILEY: No. But, your Honor, at the conclusion of a discussion, I, of course, have to go back to Dr. Moores.

THE COURT: Of course. But you people need to start writing it down so that you know what is going to happen, and with great specificity, so that there are no questions about it. Let's go.

Is there anything else you want to talk about before we break to allow you to write? Anything else?

MS. AGNEW: I do think, your Honor, plaintiffs would like to address a notion of a trial for permanent injunctions. We don't share defendants' view that we can't motion for that,

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especially given the record that was created on the preliminary injunction. And we would even point out that the cases defendants cited even say that it is proper when there are no questions of fact. We don't think there's no question of fact that they didn't train anyone, they didn't identify anyone, and they didn't fix the problem.

So we want that discussion to be live. I don't read the PLRA as to be giving them 90 days to fix it and try to moot our preliminary injunctions. I read the PLRA as not having temporary relief floating out there that has no buttressing. So we want to do that, and we want to do it quickly. our clients need it. We especially think our clients need it in light of this.

THE COURT: Why don't you do that while you are breaking to write. We will get together some dates in about 90 days out, and you put them on your calendar for trial, if that needs to be done. If it doesn't need to be done, we can always erase the dates. If, for some reason, you think it has to be done on papers, then you can do that too. But we'll give you dates now to put on your calendars.

Anything else before you break?

MS. KILEY: Just a viewpoint on the --

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

Should I address them now or later? MS. KILEY:

THE COURT: Tell me what you want.

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MS. KILEY: Okay. Very briefly, your Honor. We think the substitution of a permanent injunction is very premature right now. We would ask that the Court give us an opportunity to show that whatever terms we ultimately put in, that we be given an opportunity to show we can comply with them. And additionally, we, if there is a trial date set just in case, we definitely would like an opportunity to move for summary judgment before that.

THE COURT: I think I said we will put the trial date down so you have it on your calendars. If you think you can do it on papers, you're welcome to do that too.

> MS. KILEY: Okay. Thank you.

All right. Thank you. Off the record. THE COURT:

(Discussion off the record)

(Recess)

THE COURT: So what do we have to report?

MS. KILEY: Your Honor, we had the opportunity to meet and confer, and we were able to articulate terms that I'm able to draft an updated proposed preliminary injunction. Of course, I do need time to draft it and discuss it with Dr. Moores. Plaintiff's counsel is willing to work with me in that process to make sure that the language is appropriate, and we believe we are able to file an updated draft with the report next week.

THE COURT: Wonderful. Wonderful.

What would you like to do? I can give you three
dates. You can have the week of August 7, you can have
September 5, which is the day after Labor Day, or October 2.
Obviously, the 90 days is going to run, but perhaps you can
confer. Do you want to put down the week of October 7?
Because that's as close as we can probably get to 90 days.
MS. AGNEW: We can do August 7.
THE COURT: August 7? Forgive me. That's what I
meant, August 7.
Put that in your books for trial, and then we can talk
about summary judgment some other time.
MS. KILEY: Okay.
THE COURT: Before you go making any motions, why
don't we talk about it. Okay?
MS. AGNEW: I did suggest to counsel that maybe
pre-motion letters are in order.
THE COURT: Yes, indeedy.
MS. AGNEW: The normal trigger conversation?
THE COURT: The usual.
MS. AGNEW: Okay.
THE COURT: What else, friends?
MS. AGNEW: I think we're good, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Nice to see you. Thank you.

(Adjourned)